Introduction to The Fourfold Root

Today we looked at The Fourfold Root (herein TFR) for the first time. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (herein PSR) can be characterised as the presumption that ‘nothing is without ground or reason why it is’. According to Schopenhauer, such a presumption (at least in local form) is implicit in all attempts at explanation: to ask for an explanation of a state of affairs is to ask for the sufficient reason(s) that bring it about. [ Seems to me that an analytic philosopher will surely endorse this... have any tried to develop a conception of explanation which doesn’t rely on the PSR? Are there questions which don’t presuppose the PSR? For example, questions which don’t admit of, or don’t demand, a definite answer? ]

A sufficient reason X for state of affairs Y is one which brings about Y ( X -> Y). A necessary reason X may be a pre-requisite for state of affairs Y, but not enough, or not sufficient, to bring it about (Y -> X).

Schopenhauer’s aim in The Fourfold Root is to analyse various applications of the PSR. He will suggest that there are four distinct applications of it, which bear important differences. In Ch.2 he surveys the way that previous philosophers have failed to recognise these different applications, and so been led into error. No proof of the PSR is possible: it is the foundation of all explanation, so cannot itself be explained. To seek an explanation of it is ‘especially flagrant absurdity’ (§14).

In §49, Schopenhauer defines necessity as ‘the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is posited’. To be necessary is just to follow from a given reason. ‘Accordingly’, he writes, ‘every necessity is conditioned’. So, the idea of absolute necessity is contradictory, inconceivable. [ What about definitions like ‘could not have been otherwise’, which seem quite conceivable? ] [ I need to revisit my metaphysics notes... ]

Dina’s question: why does Schopenhauer need to make a distinction between reason and cause, given that he buys into transcendental idealism? My reply: not sure I understand the question, unless she’s simply trying to bring out the importance of maintaining the distinction between the knower and what is known, which requires that the domain about which we form judgements is distinct from, and, in some important sense, independent of, the judgements we make of it.