The Fourfold Root, 'On the first class of objects', §20-21

Dina ones more empasized the difference between 'cause' and 'reason', which has become quite clear by now. The cause is an ontological term that points out that which brings something else into existence, e.i. answers the question why something is. Reason, on the other hand, is an epistemological explanation of our knowledge of something.
The big question then is: why does Schopenhauer want to keep this distinction after annihilating ontology by claiming that every entity is a subjective representation?
I assume that he must keep the distinction because of the different classes of representations. Cause applies to intuitive representations (the first class), while reason applies to conceptual representations (the second class)

Schopenhauer asserts that causality only applies to change. This change occurs in the state of the empirical world, but not in independent objects. So each state is the effect of the state that preceded, and thus caused, it. Then it seems impossible that this change in the whole of the empirical reality started at some point without a cause. (Nothing is without a cause... or what?

too cheeky? Sorry, I'll continue)

This makes perfect sense since the causality is only a subjective principle of the knowing consciousness. It does not begin or end.

Schopenhauer claims that causality is matter, and matter is substance.
At first (realist) glance it seems as if causality is only a quality of the matter, but in Schopenhauers account it isn't. While time and space are only empty forms, they need matter to fill it up. Matter only appears when the understanding adds the form of causality to the spatio-temporal emptiness.

The second claim made perfect sense to me until we went through the meaning of the concepts in the history of philosophy. Substance corresponds usually to the greek word Ousia, 'that what makes the thing what it is' (roughly essence), while matter has only been referred to as the physical material, that the things are made of. So if you build a house, the wood would be the material but the form of the house the substance. But Schopenhauer doesn't agree with this.
I guess that matter equals substance for him because matter itself is not made up of the three forms but the manifestation of them. Substance, as what makes the thing what it is, is as well nothing but the three forms that we impose on the sensations.

Since both substance and matter are equal to causality, they must also be without a beginning and an end. So matter/substance exists eternally but changes infinitely.

The class ended with a presentation from Kristófer, he talked about the function of the faculty of the understanding. He gets all my respect for plunging into these rather dry chapters. I still find that Schopenhauers focus on sight and touch is too limited. I think we can definitely get some idea of space with only our hearing (and even just smelling, even though it is much poorer), this we can see in the cases of blind people, bats and the comic-book hero Daredevil. But I agree that this doesn't change the main claim that the chapter supports: the sensation needs the understanding, whose form is the principle of sufficient reason, to make perceptions.

Kristján