Introduction to Schopenhauer and German Idealism

Dina began the course by giving a brief overview of German Idealism, outlining how the tradition developed in response to Kant, in particular to his distinction between the world-of-appearance and the world-as-it-is-in-itself (herein: ‘appearance’ / ‘in-itself’ ). Despite the name, transcendental idealism is a form of (intuitive) metaphysical realism which is usually understood to carry minimal ontological commitments (indeed, Kantian epistemology declares ontology impossible). Fichte, Shelling and Hegel criticise Kant for his intuitive realism, claiming that the notion of the in-itself, which exists independently of all minds, should be dispensed with. Their absolute idealism consists in a flat denial of the in-itself. For them, Dina says, ‘epistemology becomes ontology’. [ I'm not sure how to understand this. ]

Schopenhauer accepts Kant’s distinction between the appearances and the in-itself but rejects a key tenet of his epistemology, namely that the in-itself is completely unknowable. He accepts that it cannot be a subject of knowledge in the normal sense, but thinks, contra Kant, that some kind of approach is possible, due to the fact that we, subjects, are ourselves manifestations of the in-itself.

Broadly, the German Idealists are systematic philosophers who held that philosophy should aim at a complete explanation of the world, a final and eternal Weltanshauung. Both Hegel and Schopenhauer sincerely claimed to have achieved this. [ I wonder whether the late Schopenhauer might have retracted this claim: did he really consider the world to be so fundamentally understandable? While I can imagine how this view might come naturally within a Hegelian framework, my current impression is that Schopenhauer’s will is much more formless, blind, dionysian... so if the world really is this way, why should we expect to be able to develop such a comprehensive, unchanging system of thought? Perhaps idealists are just prone to this presumption; the world’s dependency on the mind making the mind’s phenomenal (posited) ability to comprehend it so comprehensively seem less incredible. Nevertheless, given Schopenhauer’s anticipation of Darwinian / Nietzschean themes concerning motivation and the role of consciousness, it would be surprising if he didn’t question this idea. ]